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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from the entry of a Summary Judgment in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.

This Court

has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code
Annotated (1953), as amended.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the lower court err in ruling that the Appellee

was the "surviving spouse" of the Decedent pursuant to §75-2-803,
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended?
2.

Is the Appellee an heir of the Decedent, Russell S.

Farrell?

2

APPLICABLE STATUTE
§75-2-803 provides as follows:
(1) A person who is divorced from the decedent or whose
marriage to the decedent has been annulled is not a
surviving spouse unless, by virtue of a subsequent
marriage, he is married to the decedent at the time of
death. A decree of separation which does not terminate
the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for
purposes of this section. An interlocutory decree of
divorce or annulment is a divorce or annulment for the
purposes of this section.
(2) For purposes of parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this chapter
and of section 75-3-203, a surviving spouse does not
include:
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final
decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an
annulment of their marriage, which decree or judgment is
not recognized as valid in this state, unless they
subsequently
participate
in
a
marriage
ceremony
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently
live together as man and wife:
(b) A person who, following a decree of judgment
of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent,
participates in a marriage ceremony with a third person;
or
(c) A person who was a party to a valid proceeding
concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital
property rights.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a probate proceeding filed in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the
Petitioner-Appellee, Phyllis Farrell.

(R.2)

On August 22, 1990,

Petitioner filed a document entitled "Petition for Determination
of Heirs" in which she sought an order from the Court determining
her to be the surviving spouse of the Decedent, Russell S. Farrell.
(R.31) The Appellants, comprising all the natural children of the
Decedent, filed an Objection to the Petition for Determination of
Heirs on September 12, 1990.

(R.33)

Thereafter, a Motion for

Summary Judgment was brought by the Petitioner-Appellee.

(R.41)

After the filing of appropriate memoranda and oral argument, the
court below entered an Order granting the summary judgment of
Petitioner-Appellee and determining Phyllis Farrell to be the
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent.

(R.86)

This appeal of that

Order was taken by Appellants on December 26, 1990.

4

(R.89)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants are the adult children of the Decedent Russell
S. Farrell.

Russell was previously married to Thelma G. Farrell,

which marriage was terminated by a decree of divorce entered a
number of years previous to the facts relevant to this case.

The

Appellee was married to Russell following his divorce from Thelma.
The following facts are undisputed and established by the record:
1.

Phyllis and Russell Farrell met in 1975.

married on April 22, 1978.
2.

(R.44)

In early 1989, Phyllis and Russell separated and

determined to obtain a divorce.
3.

They were

(R.59)

The summons and complaint for divorce was filed by

Phyllis against Russell in the Third Judicial District Court on or
about April 7, 1989.
4.

(R.59)

The parties stipulated to the entry of the divorce

and to a property settlement.

Russell, the Decedent, signed a

document entitled "Acceptance of Service, Appearance, Consent and
Waiver" on the 8th day of April, 1989, which document was filed for
record in the Third Judicial District Court on May 19, 1989. Said
document provides as follows:
COMES NOW the Defendant, Russell S. Farrell, having
received a copy of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint in the
above-entitled matter, and having read the allegations
contained therein, and being aware of his right to seek
legal advice, herewith enters his appearance, consents
to the personal jurisdiction of the Court, waives the
statutory time in which to answer or otherwise respond
to Plaintiff's Complaint, and consents that judgment by
default may be entered against him at any time and
without further notice to him. (R.60)
5

5.

Following

the

execution

by

Decedent

of

the

Acceptance, he moved to the State of Alaska and commenced full-time
employment as a merchant seaman.
to the State of Utah.
6.
July

7,

Russell Farrell never returned

(R.60)

The divorce action was originally set for default

1989, exactly

91 days

following

the

filing

of the

Complaint. Because Phyllis failed to appear at the hearing, a new
default hearing was set for July 10, 1989. Again, Phyllis failed
to appear and the matter was reset for default hearing on August
21, 1989.

(R.60)
7. At all times subsequent to Russell's execution of the

document consenting to the divorce, the Decedent believed himself
to be divorced from the Appellee and so conducted his affairs.
(R.61)
8.

Upon the expiration of the mandatory ninety-day

waiting period, there was no legal impediment to the entry of the
divorce.
9.

Russell Farrell died on August 15, 1989, when the

boat upon which he was employed capsized.
10.

(R.51)

A Decree of Divorce was entered terminating the

marriage of Russell and Phyllis on August 25, 1989, pursuant to the
default hearing which had been held on August 21, 1989.
11.

(R.52)

Neither the Appellee nor the children had any

knowledge of the death of Russell until sometime following August
21, 1989.

6

12.

The Decree of Divorce was set aside and vacated on

October 2, 1989, pursuant to the motion of Appellee.

7

(R.52)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants contend that the trial court committed reversible
error when it ruled that the Appellee, Phyllis Farrell, was the
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent for purposes of the probate
action.

§75-2-803 was drafted as a part of the Uniform Probate

Code, and was specifically enacted by the Utah Legislature to cover
precisely the situation which this Court has before it.

The

statute expressly states that a surviving spouse does not include:
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final decree
or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an annulment
of their marriage, which decree or judgment is not
recognized as valid in this state, unless they
subsequently
participate
in a marriage ceremony
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently
live together as man and wife.
At the time the Decedent left the State of Utah, he believed
himself to be divorced.

He left in the hands of his spouse,

Phyllis, the responsibility to see that the divorce was entered.
There was no legal impediment to the entry of a decree of divorce
on July 7, 1989, when the default hearing was originally set. The
only reason that the divorce was not entered prior to the death of
the Decedent was the inaction and negligence of the Appellee.
Accordingly,

the Appellee

is estopped

to claim

that

she is

Russell's surviving spouse for purposes of probate and is further
estopped in her claim as an heir of the estate of Mr. Farrell.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLEE IS PROHIBITED FROM
BEING AN HEIR OF THE DECEDENT
It is the position of the children of the Decedent that the
undisputed facts mandate a finding that the Appellee is not a
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent and is therefore not entitled
to take or share in the distribution of the Decedent's estate. It
is patently clear that but for the inaction of the Appellee, she
and Decedent would have been divorced long prior to the death of
the Decedent.
divorced.

In the mind of the Decedent, the parties were

To thus allow the Appellee to benefit from her own

negligence would be patently inequitable and would be contrary to
the desires of the Decedent.
This precise situation was envisioned by the legislature and
provided for in the Utah Probate Code. Section 75-2-803, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended, specifically provides that Phyllis
Farrell

is not a surviving

spouse.

The statute states, in

pertinent part, as follows:
(2) For purposes of parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter
and of Section 75-3-203, a surviving spouse does not
include:
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final
decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an
annulment of their marriage which decree or judgment is
not recognized as valid in this State, unless they
subsequently
participate
in a marriage ceremony
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently
live together as man and wife.
9

In order to properly apply this statute to the present
situation, the editorial comments which follow in the Code are
instructive.

There the drafters of the legislation state:

Subsection (1) states an obvious proposition, but
Subsection (2) deals with the difficult problem of
invalid divorce or annulment, which is particularly
frequent as to foreign divorce decrees but may arise as
to a local decree where there is some defect in
jurisdiction; the basic principle underlying these
provisions is estoppel against the surviving spouse.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 75-2-803 is directly applicable to the situation here
at issue.

The parties were in the process of a divorce.

The

Appellee, without knowledge of Mr. Farrell's death, obtained a
Decree of Divorce. In Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975), this
Court

ruled

that

a

decree

of

divorce

entered

under

such

circumstances is void. Accordingly, the District Court entered an
order striking the earlier Decree.
To come within the parameters of §75-2-803 the Appellee must
be a person who (a) obtains or (b) consents to a final decree or
judgment or divorce from the Decedent, (c) which decree is not
recognized as valid in this State.
these criteria with precision.

The Appellee meets each of

In the language of the statute,

Appellee is "a person who obtained a final decree of divorce from
the decedent which is not recognized as valid in this state".
That §75-2-803 does not apply to Appellee's Decree because
the same was void when entered is a fallacy.

The editorial

comments cited above make it clear that the Legislature intended
to cover all situations where decrees were void, not merely

10

voidable. The comments declare that §75-2-803 is intended to cover
decrees "where there is some defect in jurisdiction." As the Court
is aware, where there is no jurisdiction, the action of any court
is null and void.

Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah, 1988).

The fact or lack of fact which causes the action to be void is
irrelevant.

In this case, the Decree of Divorce was void, thereby

bringing into play §75-2-803.
Section 75-2-803 is a part of the Uniform Probate Code which
has been enacted, in similar form, in a number of states.

There

has been at least one case in which this Section has been applied
to facts which are similar to the case at hand.

In Prudential

Insurance Company of America v. Dulek, et al, 655 F.2d 217 (8th
Cir. 1981) the decedent's former wife attempted to collect certain
insurance benefits payable at the death of the decedent, her former
husband.

At the time of the husband's death, the parties had

received a preliminary divorce decree which would not become final
for a period of six months.

At the time of the death the

preliminary decree had been entered for only two months leaving
four months until the same would become final.
The Circuit Court reversed a summary judgment by the lower
Court in favor of the former wife. The Court first determined that
the applicable state law was not the law of domestic relations but
was rather the Nebraska Probate Code.

The Nebraska Probate Code

contained a provision which was identical to Section 75-2-803. The
Circuit Court specifically held that under the statute the former

11

spouse was not a "surviving spouse" for purposes of distribution
of the estate.
Additional support for the position of the children of the
Decedent is found in paragraph

(1) of §75-2-803.

The first

sentence states the obvious proposition that a spouse who has been
finally divorced is not a surviving spouse.

However, the Utah

Legislature substantially broadened the reach of paragraph (1) when
it added the following language:
An interlocutory decree of divorce or annulment is a
divorce or annulment for the purposes of this section.
This language was added as a part of the section in 1975, at
a time when the standard procedure in divorce matters was to grant
an interlocutory divorce which became final automatically at the
expiration of ninety (90) days. While this procedure was abolished
at the time Appellee divorced the Decedent, it is instructive as
to the intent of the Legislature.
Clearly, §75-2-803(1) is intended to apply not only to final
decrees, but also to divorces which will become final at the
expiration of a period of time. In the case at hand, the Appellee
and Russell Farrell had consented to the entry of a decree of
divorce.

The only impediment to a final decree was the passage of

time, nothing more. By the inclusion of the above language in §752-803(1), the Legislature covered such situations.

In substance

and in effect, Appellee had an interlocutory divorce and was,
therefore, not a surviving

spouse

succession.

12

for purposes of

intestate

POINT II
APPELLEE IS BARRED AS A
"SURVIVING SPOUSE" ON EQUITABLE GROUNDS
Application of §75-2-803 to bar the claim of the Appellee as
an heir of the Decedent's estate is appropriate not only because
the clear language of the statute applies to the situation but also
because equity demands this result.

The editorial comments which

have been cited to the Court above make note of the fact that the
basic principles underlying the application of the statute are
estoppel and equity.

No doubt what the original drafters of the

legislation intended to say was that it is simply unfair to grant
a person surviving spouse status when that person has, for all
intents and purposes, undergone a divorce with the decedent.

In

such cases, the drafters of §75-2-803 felt that the person claiming
such status is estopped.
These general notions of equity and estoppel were noted by the
Eight Circuit Court in the Dulek decision.
5).

Id. at 220 (Footnote

See also, Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964) and

Brantley v. Skeens. 266 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In the case at hand equitable principles demand a finding that
the Appellee is not the surviving spouse of the Decedent.
parties had been separated since early in 1989.

The

The Decedent had

consented, in full, to a divorce and had left the State believing
that he was divorced.

The Appellee would have been granted her

divorce in July of 1989, fully one month before the Decedent's
death, had

she simply

shown up
13

in court.

Appellee has no

explanation or good reason why she did not appear.

However,

because she did not appear, she now seeks a potential windfall as
the surviving spouse of the Decedent.
It is clear that the Utah Legislature was concerned about this
potential result when it enacted the applicable statute.
also apparent that the Legislature

intended

It is

to prevent such

inequitable results when parties find themselves in a situation
where nothing more than the passage of time stands in the way of
the entry of a final decree.

This inequity is compounded by the

fact that the natural heirs of the Decedent are deprived of the
limited assets of the estate through no fault of the Decedent or
of themselves.
A more appropriate factual situation for the application of
§75-2-803 cannot be constructed.

If the plain language of the

statute does not bar Appellee's claim as surviving spouse, then
principles of equity and estoppel must act as that bar.

14

CONCLUSION
This is t*

ivc-H opportunity for this Cour4" *-~ *~~i,r *~*

interpret §75-2-803.

favor :. . the children

Decedent 11. i
language ol the statute.
which was meant -..

•:; \*

exactly the situation

covered by the statute

then the statute has

the driving force behind §75-2

r;ar. .-ame principal demands

a reversal

nstance.

Attorney for Appellants
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ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Attorney for Petitioner
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Telephone: (801) 255-4774
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF:

ORDER DETERMINING
HEIRS

RUSSELL S. FARRELL,
Civil No. 893900994ES
Decedent.
This matter came regularly before the Court on the
16th day of November, 1990 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, for consideration
of the Motion for Summary Judgment of Phyllis Farrell.
Phyllis Farrel was represented by Robert H. Wilde.

Duane

R. Smith represented David Farrell, Deanne Farrell and
Laurie Farrell.

The Court having reviewed the file, the

Memoranda and Affidavits filed pertaining to the motion
and having taken judicial notice of file number D89-1198
in this Court and good cause appearing therefor.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the Motion
of Phyllis Farrell for Summary Judgment is granted and
Phyllis Farrell is hereby determined to be the widow of

RusselJ S. Farrell and an heir to the Estate of Russell S,
Farrell.
Dated this

££

day of

A/@&A$*J6<!^

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

#

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
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